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EvmENCE-UNCONTRADICTED TESTIMONY-The great majority
of jurisdictions in the United States recognize the rule that in civil
cases "clear, positive, direct and undisputed testimony, not improbable
or contradictory, given by an unimpeached witness, cannot be rejected
or disregarded by either court or jury, unless the evidence discloses
facts and circumstances which furnish a reasonable ground for so
doing." 1 It is the purpose of this comment to discuss (I) the reasons
underlying this rule, and the extent to which it is recognized, rejected
or limited in various jurisdictions; (2) the application of the rule to
fact situations in jurisdictions where it is recognized.

A. The Rule of Law
I. The underlying problem. Questions of fact are normally left
to the trier of fact, hereinafter referred to, for the sake of simplicity,
as the jury. In deciding whether a fact testified to by a witness has been
proved, the jury must decide whether that witness is to be believed.
Where such testimony is uncontradicted, the legal problem arises
whether the jury is to have absolute freedom to believe or disbelieve

1

Olson v. Hoffman, 175 Minn. 287, 221 N.W. 10·(1928).
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the witness, or whether under some circumstances it must accept his
testimony as true. On the one hand it may be urged that in order to
maintain our traditional jury system, the question of a witness' cre(½bility must be left to a_ completely independent jury without interference by the judge. On the other, it may be argued that the possibility that a jury may abuse its privilege requires the judge to place
some limits beyond which the jury may not go in exercising its discretion.
2. Minority rule-absolute privilege to disbJJlieve. Massachusetts has· answered this problem by conferring an absolute privilege on
the jury to believe or disbelieve any witness. The approach of the
Massachusetts court is illustrated in a case involving a contested will.
One of the issues was whether the will had been duly executed; a subscribing witness ·having testified without contradiction that the will had
been duly executed, the trial court directed a· verdict on this issue.
Holding that this instruction was erroneous, the Supreme Court observed: ''While the jury, upon the facts, could not have been expected
to reach any other conclusion than that which was recorded under the
direction of the court, the issue ~as one to be passed upon by a jury,
which is the ordinary tribunal for the determination of questions of
fact. Where a proposition is only to be established by testimony of
witnesses, the judge cannot properly direct a jury to decide that the
fact is proved affirmatively by testimony. It is for the jury to say
whether the witnesses are entitled to credit." 2
Maryland 8 has adopted the Massachusetts rule, and Pennsylvania"'
follows it, with the qualification that the trial court may grant a new
trial (but may not enter a judgment n. o. v.) if it believes the jury
capriciously disregarded the testimony of a witness. In Missouri,
earlier doubts 5 seem to have been resolved in favor of the Massachusetts rule. 6
3. Minority rule-privilege to disbelieve interested witness.
Other courts, unwilling to permit the jury to disbelieve the testimony
of any and all witnesses, have left it with this privilege where the witness is interested.' The reasons for this rule are largely the sam~ as
2
Giles v. Giles, 204 Mass. 383 at 385, 90 N.E. 595 (1910); see also, cases
cited in Lindenbaum v. N.Y., N.H. & H. R.R., 197 Mass. 314 at 323, 84 N.E. 129
(1908); Krinsky v. Whitney, 315 Mass. 661, 54 N.E. (2d) 36 (1944).
8
Alexander v. Tingle, 181 Md. 464, 30 A. (2d) 737. (1943).
"'MacDonald v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 348 Pa. 558, 36 A. (2d) 492 (1944);
8 TEMPLE L. Q. 434 (1934).
5
Baird v. Wilks, (Mo. App. 1920) 218 S.W. 918.
6
Lafferty .v. Kansas City Casualty Co., 287 Mo. 555, 229 S.W. 750 (1921);
Wiener v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 352 Mo. 673, 179 S.W. (2d) 39
(1944).
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those which formerly barred interested witnesses from testifying. It is
said that a man deeply interested in the results of a given event can, not judge correctly the true facts surrounding it, even in the every-day
affairs of life outside a courtroom, and that when he is called upon to
testify to these facts it is highly probable either that he will succumb
to the temptation deliberately to distort the facts, or that he will be
unable, even in the exercise of the utmost good faith, to describe them
accurately.
Accordingly, the New York courts at first refused to recognize the
testimony of interested witnesses as conclusive, however strong the witness' story; later, however, this doctrine was abandoned.7 The question was unsettled in Texas as late as 1931,8 but the following rule now
seems established in that state: "While the jury has no right arbitrarily
to disregard the positive testimony of unimpeached and uncontradicted
witnesses, the mere fact that the witness is interested in the result of
the suit is deemed sufficient to require the credibility of his testimony
to be submitted to the jury." 9 The same rule is in force in Arkansas,1°
Arizona,11 and possibly Washington.12
4. The majority rule. Most states have been unwilling to allow
the jury a free rein in rejecting the testimony even of an interested
witne!',s. Probably the most searching analysis of the reasons for this
conclusion is found in the opinion of Justice Campbell of the South
Dakota Supreme Court in Jerke v. Delmont State Bank. 18 In that
case, the action of the trial court in directing a verdict on the basis of
uncontradicted testimony of an interested witness was upheld, although
the judgment was reversed on other grounds. Rejecting the "glittering generality" that "questions of fact are for the jury," the court
reasoned that the jury, a part of the machinery of the court under the
7

For a strong presentation of the arguments in favor of leaving the credibility
of interested witnesses to, the jury, as well as a detailed analysis of the New York
cases, see Bobbe, "The Uncontradicted Testimony of an Interested Witness," 20 CoRN.
L. Q. 33 (1935).
8
Golden v. First State Bank of Bomarton, (Tex. Civ~ App. 1931) 38 S.W. (2d)
628., 9
Simmonds v. St. L., B. & M. Ry. Co., 127 Tex. 23, 91 S.W. (2d) 332 (1936);
Gammill v. Mullins, (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) 188 S.W. (2d) 986.
,
10
SkiIIem v. Baker, 82 Ark. 86, 100 S.W. 764 (1907); McCollum v. Graber,
207 Ark. 1053, 184 S.W. (2d) 264 (1944).
11
Lentz v. Landers, 21 Ariz. 117, 185 P. 821 (1919); MacRae v. MacRae,
57 Ariz. 157, 112 P. (2d) 213 (194r).
12
Early cases so holding, such as Citizens' Savings Bank v. Houtchens, 64 Wash.
275, 116 P. 866 (19u), seem never to have been overruled. Little recent light on
the subject has been discovered. Nearhoff v. Rucker, 156 Wash. 621, 287 P. 658
(1930), held that the jury was not bound to accept an interested witness' testimony,
but the opinion indicates that this may not have been on the ground of interest alone.
13
54 S.D. 446, 223 N.W. 585 (1929).
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general control of the judge, must be confined to a reasonable, rational
process in its determination of facts. The credibility of a witness must
be tested rationally, just as any other question involved in the litigation; "the mere fact of interest in the controversy does not in and of
itself, and apart from other circumstances appearing in the case, render
it a reasonable thing to disbelieve the testimony of a witness whom
otherwise it would be unreasonable to disbelieve...." 14 The court concluded that "the rule of reasonable judgment must be applied to each
case upon its particular facts, and, if the testimony in behalf of the
party having the burden of proof is clear and full, not extraordinary
or incredible in the light of general experience, and not contradicted,
either directly or indirectly, by other witnesses or by circumstances disclosed, and is so plain and complete that disbelief therein could not
arise by rational processes applied to the evidence, ... it is not only
permissible, but highly proper, to direct a verdict, and the direction of
such verdict should not be prevented merely by reason of the fact that
one or more of the witnesses are interested in the transaction or the
result of the suit." 15
This attempt to break down the approach of v~ious courts into
three "rules" is subject to the infirmities of any effort to generalize
and classify the reactions of different courts to different fact situations.
It seems clear, however, that there is a real difference between what
might be termed the separation of powers approach of the Massachusetts court, which seems to regard judge and jury as independent,
sovereign agencies, and the approach of the South Dakota court, which
recognizes the supreme control of the judge over all agencies of the
judicial process, including the jury. It also seems clear that the great
weight of authority supports the South Dakota court.16
The difference between the Texas court and the South Dakota
court as to testimony of interested witnesses is less basic; even though
interest of itself may not be a ground for denying credence, it is cer14

Id. at 461.
Id. at 467.
16
Cases are collected in 8 A.L.R. 796 ( I 920). For more recent developments,
see Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Abraham, 70 Cal. App. (2d) 776, 161
P. (2d) 689 (1945) (uncontradicted testimony of defendant's lawyer binding on
trial court); Thomas v. Lockwood, 198 Ga. 437, 31 S.E. (2d) 791 (1944) (uncontradicted testimony of disinterested witness binding on jury); Idaho Times Pub.
Co. v. Industrial Accident Board, 63 Idaho 720, 126 P. (2d) 573 (1942) (uncontradicted testimony of interested witness binding on Board); Mammina v. Homeland Ins. Co., 371 Ill. 555, 21 N.E. (2d) 726 (1939) (uncontradicted testimony of
disinterested witness binding on trial court); Johnson v. Tregle, (La. App. 1942) 8
S. ( 2d) 7 5 5 (corroborated testimony of plaintiff binding on trial court even though
improbable); Standifer v. Standifer, 192 Okla. 669, 138 P. (2d) 825 (1943)
(defendant's corroborated, uncontradicted testimony binding on trial court).
15
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tainly considered among other factors by all courts in determining
whether qncontradicted testimony must be accepted. 11 It will be noted
that most of the· cases discussed later in this comment involved testimony of interested witnesses; in a close case testimony of an interested
witness may be considered improbable when similar testimony of a
disinterested witness might have been accepted as conclusive. Conversely, courts have fastened upon interest as a reason for submitting a
witness' testimony to the jury when there were other factors which
would have justified the result.18

B. Application of the Majority Rule
By referring to the statement of the majority rule in the opening
paragraph of this comment, it will be seen that numerous qualifications
are placed upon its application to specific fact situations. Quite obviously, it applies only where the testimony is "undisputed" 19 and
"given by an unimpeached witness." 20 The requirement that the testimony be "clear" and "positive" permits th~ jury to disregard it where
the witness is discredited by his manner on the stand.21 The testimony
17
Compare the statement of the Kentucky court that the majority rule "does
not necessarily apply, if the uncontradicted evidence is given by interested witnesses.
In this connection it may be said that the evidence, although uncontradicted, must
be positive, clear, and unequivocal.•.•" Bullock v. Gay, Admr., 296 Ky. 489 at 491,
177 S.W. (2d). 883 (1944). Rejection of the testimony was justified in this case
partly because the witness was interested, and partly because of weaknesses in the
testimony itself; the result in this case seems typical: interest added to some other
factor affecting credibility requires submission of the testimony to the jury.
18 "Indeed, there is but little real support for the frequently stated rule that
the interest of a witness renders his Ul}COntradicted testimony a question for the jury.
In the following cases, statelllents of the character referred to may be found, but the
rule will not be found to have been applied except where the testimony of the interested witness ••. was . • • inconsistent with other portions of his testimony, with
other evidence, or with the natural probabilities, or the conduct or attitude of the witness was such as to cast suspicion on his credibility." 72 A.L.R. 27 at 32 (1931).
19
Testimony has been considered undisputed within the rule where contradicted
on an immaterial point. State v. Fraley, 189 Okla. 5u, II8 P. (2d) 1023 (1941).
But where it was contradicted -on a material point, the jury was held to be entitled
to disregard it entirely. Lyric Amusement Co. v. Jeffries, 58 Ariz. 381, I 20
P~ (2d) 417 (~941).
_
2
° Clearly if the witness is shown to have a bad character the jury is justified in
refusing to believe him. Or if he can be shown to have made contradictory statements out of court his testimony may be rejected. Williams v. Jayne, 210 Minn.
594, 299 N.W. 853 (1941). Although it is generally said that a witness may be
impeached by showing he is interested [3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., § 966
( I 940)], as has been shown above this generally is not considered justification for
disregarding his uncontradicted testimony.
21
Napper v. Rice, 127 W.Va. 157, 32 S.E. (2d) 41 (1944). But ,the facts
justifying rejection on this ground must appear in -the record. Williams v. Jayne,
supra, note 20.
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must be "direct" and not a matter of opinion, conjecture or inference.22
Of the many qualifications placed upon the majority rule, those.which
require that the testimony be "not improbable or contradictory" and
that there be no ('facts and circumstances which furnish a reasonable
ground" for disregarding it most frequently raise fighting issues in its
application.
r. Improbability. Probably the most frequently asserted ground
for refusing to accept undisputed testimony is that the witness' story is
improbable. Opposite extremes in dealing with the credibility of improbable testimony are illustrated in two recent cases.
The first case was an action for damages for an alleged assault.
The plaintiff was a 52-year-old woman chiropractor, who lived and
practiced her trade in two ro.oms on the second floor of a hotel in a
small Montana town. She testified that the defendant, a 27-year-old
married man from whom she was trying to borrow money, visited her
in her office at nine o'clock in the evening and attewpted to rape her.
Apparently there was no direct evidence contradicting her statements.
The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff, and judgment was entered
thereon. On appeal, judgment was reversed in a 3-2 decision. 28 The
majority felt that plaintiff's testimony was to0 improbable to support
the verdict, in view of the facts that plaintiff was almost twice defendant's age; that although the incident was alleged to have occurred in
a more or less public place there was no evidence that anyone heard a
disturbance; that plaintiff had been trying to get money from defendant and continued to do so after the alleged assault; and that plaintiff
failed to report the incident to anyone until several months after it
was alleged to have happened. The dissenting judges felt that the
appellate court should not substitute its judgment for that of the jury
in deciding whether to believe plaintiff's story. None of the judges regarded the testimony as binding on the jury.
The second case, tried by a Louisiana district court, involved a
claim for workmen's compensation. Plaintiff testified that he had been
injured by a blow from a crank which kicked back while he was attempting to start his employer's truck. He was corroborated by an
eyewitness. An eminent physician testified for defendant that he
doubted that plaintiff's injuries could have been caused in this manner.
An equally eminent physician testified for plaintiff that while such an
injury from such a cause is extremely rare, similar instances have been
22

In Glass v. Bosworth, 113 Vt. 303, 34 A. (2d) 113 (1943), a doctor!s up.contradicted testimony that injuries sustained by plaintiff in a collision aggravated a
long-standing heart ailment was held not to be conclusive because it was a matter of
opinion and not of demonstrable fact.
28
Cullen v. Peschel, II5 Mont. 187, 142 P. (2d) 559 (1943).
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recorded i~ medical texts. The trial court found that it was too improbable that such an accident could have occurred, or if it did, that
plaintiff's injuries resulted therefrom. Judgment for defendant was
reversed on appeal, the opinion stating in part that "conclusions of improbability must and should ordinarily yield to uncontroverted ~vidence, such as we find in the testimony of plaintiff and ·corroborated
by an eyewitness/' 2 ¾
•
_
Thus the Montana court decided that improbable testimony could
not support a verdict for the witness, 25 while the Louisiana ,court decided that it required such a verdict. 26 Between these two extremes is
a wide area where improbability furnishes a ground for submitting uncontradicted testimony to the jury. An example is a suit recently
brought by the administrator of Joanna Held to declare void transfers
under which her nephews, Fred and Isaac Morris, claimed title to a
ranch formerly owned by the decedent. Isaac and Fred held deeds to
the ranch; the issue was whether these deeds had been delivered. The
evidence showed that Isaac, Fred, and Fred's wife, Pearl, occupied
and operated the ranch from ,1929 to 1941 while their aunt lived in a
nearby city, and that they were frequent visitors at the home of their
aunt~ who was extremely fond of Fred and Isaac. Pearl testified that
in 1939 Mrs. Held handed her a sealed envelope marked·"To Fred
and Isaac Morris," telling her that the deeds were enclosed but that
they were not to be recorded until after Mrs. Held's death; she also
testified that she had shown this envelope to Fred and Isaac, but that
no one had opened it until Mrs. Held died. Although this testimony
was uncontradicted the court to which the case was tried held that the
deeds were void for lack of delivery. This decision was affirmed on
appeal 21 on the ground that Pearl's story was inherently improbable.
It was felt that the trial j1;1dge was warranted in refusing to believe

.

2

Johnson v. Tregle, (La. App. 1942) 8 S. (2d) 755 at 758.
While it seems doubtful that' the testimony in the Montana case was too im,probable to support the verdict, this is the usual result where the testimony is contrary
to scientific principles or natural laws. In Louisville Water Co. v. Lally, 168 Ky. 348,
182 S.W. 186 (1916), plaintiff's corroborated testimony, uncontradicted, was held
insufficient to support a finding that defendant water company had turned on water
in city mains with such force that it unscrewed a closed faucet in plaintiff's home,
flooding it. See also 21 A.L.R. 141 (1922).
26
See also Huber v. Rosing, 22 Wash. (2d) IIO, 154 P. (2d) 609 (1944),
holding that uncontradicted testimony of witnesses for the defendant that he was
driving fifteen miles per hour when his car collided with plaintiff's truck could not
be disregarded even though evidence of damage to the truck tended to show that
defendant was driving faster. The explanation of the rulings in both cases would
seem to be that direct evidence should prevail over evidence based on opinion or
speculation.
27
Crilly v. Morris, (S.D. 1945) 19 N.W. (2d) 836.
¾
25
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that Fred and Isaac would have left an envelope containing such a
valuable gift unopened for a year and a half; that Mrs. Held would
have delivered the deeds in a sealed envelope;· or that she would give
the deeds to Pearl instead of directly to her favored nephews.
In another recent case involving a decedent's property, the appellate court was more favorably inclined toward plaintiff's story. Plaintiff, a woman theatrical performer, sued for specific performance of
an alleged contract by which decedent promised to devise his estate
to her in return for her giving up a trip to Europe in furtherance of
her career. The evidence showed that plaintiff and decedent had en- "
joyed a close but platonic friendship for forty-two years, decedent
regularly eating supper at plaintiff's residence and spending the evening there reading. Decedent, a member of the bar, left a will disposing of his property to persons other than the plaintiff. The trial
court's decree refusing relief was reversed on appeal. 28 The ·majority
opinion reasoned that plaintiff's uncontradicted testimony, corroborated
by her daughter and a friend, was neither improbable nor inconsistent
and could not be rejected. The fact that the corroborating witnesses
were acquainted with or related to the pla~ntiff was held not to impeach them. The fact that decedent, a lawyer, had failed to revoke
his old will did not render the story improbable, inasmuch as lawyers
are notoriously careless about their own legal affairs. One dissenting
judge, noting that the story rested largely on the testimony •of interested witnesses, felt that the trial court might properly reject it
since it was shown that decedent paid for all his meals with plaintiff
and, although working in a courthouse where he must have been impressed with the disastrous effects of failure to revoke an outmoded
will, had failed to do so even when the matter was called to his attention shortly before his death.
2. Circwmstances contradicting testimony. A story which is not
improbable may nevertheless be rejected if other circumstances disclosed by the evidence furnish a reasonable ground for doing so. In an
action on tw9 fire insurance policies covering lumber which burned on
a Saturday night, the defendant insurer denied that the policies had
been issued before the :fire. Defendant's local agent, authorized to
issue policies, testified that he executed the policies on the Wednesday
and Thursday preceding the fire. Defendant having introduced no
evidence on this issue, the trial court instructed the jury that the fact
that the policies had been issued was conclusively established. On
defendant's appeal, this instruction was held to be erroneous. 29 NotDowning v. Maag, 215 Minn. 506, IO N.W. (2d) 778 (1943).
Michigan Pipe Co. v. Michigan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 92 Mich. 482, 52
N.W. 1070 (1892).
28
29
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ing that the agent's wife was a stockholder in, and his brother-in-law
an officer of, the plaintiff corporation, the appellate court pointed to a
number of circumstances casting suspicion on the testimony, concluding
that the jury must determine its credibility. Plaintiff's evidence revealed that when one of its officers asked the agent for the policies on
Sunday he failed to produce them, explaining that they were not ready
for d~livery. Neither of t~e policies was completed until the Monday
following the fire, and none of the employees at the agent's office saw
the policies or any record of them before the fire. Although the agent
had been instructed to report all insurance to defendant on the day
it was issued, he did not mail a report of this insurance until the Mon~
day following the fire, and then took advantage of his position as the
local postmaster to postmark the envelope containing the report July
5 (Saturday) instead of July- 7 (Monday). In other respects the
agent's conduct was not only in violation of instructions but fraudulent;
the case.seems a clear one for denying conclusiveness to his testimony.
In a more recent case, plaintiff's uncontradicted testimony revealed circumstances which did not tend so strongly to arouse suspicion
but which nevertheless furp.ished a reasonable ground for its rejection.
Plaintiff sued to impress a trust upon a house and lot which she had
bought for her son. To rebut the presumption that the transaction
was intended as a gift to the son, both plaintiff and the son testified
that they had agreed that plaintiff should have the beneficial interest
in the property. The trial court nevertheless refused relief; judgment
was affirmed on appeal.so Plaintiff had permitted her son to mortgage
the property to secure his personal debt, had left the son and his wife
in sole possession, and had permitted them to make alterations and
improvements without consulting her. These circumstances were considered to be more consistent with the presumption of an intended gift
than with the asserted intent to retain a beneficial interest.
In a suit on a bond by the administrator of the decedent payee,
the defendant maker answered that the note had been paid. Two disinterested witnesses testified that decedent had told them defendant
had owed him money but had repaid it. The case was tried to the
court, which found that the bond had not been paid. Affirming a
judgment for plaintiff, the appellate court found that evidence of circumstances indirectly contradicting the testimony entitled the trial
court to disregard it.81 The decedent was a prudent business man, customarily depositiJ:Ig large sums in the bank upon receipt, but no such
deposits were made corresponding to the alleged payments made by
defendant. It was also shown that decedent lived in the country;
so Gomez v. Cecena, 15 Cal. (2d)" 363,
81

IOI P. (2d) 477 (1940).
_Martyn v. Jacoby's Admr., 223 Ky. 674, 4 S.W.,(2d) 684 (1928).
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while the defendant claimed to have paid in cash, the court felt that
he would not have taken currency to decedent at his country home
when he could more safely and conveniently have paid by check.
Elements of inherent improbability are often combined with independent evidence of contradictory circumstances. An interesting
example is found. in an action against the ex-treasurer of a county in
California for conversion _of its funds. To account for the missing
funds, defendant te~tified that as he was removing money from the
vault in his office at the county courthouse one morning, he was accosted by an armed man who ordered him to drop the money; that he
then lost consciousness, apparently from a blow on the head; that he
revived later, locked inside the vault, and attempted to attract attention by kicking on its door; and that when he was released, the money
was missing. His wife testified that she visited the courthouse that
afternoon in search of her husband; finding the office door locked, she
became alarmed, got the janitor to unlock the door, entered the office
and opened the vault, releasing defendant. Two witnesses who were
with her during the rescue corrobated her story in part, and there was
no direct evidence contradicting it. Confronted with a seemingly impregnable defense, the court to which the case was tried found nevertheless for the plaintiff. Judgment was affirmed on appeal.22 The
court reasoned that it was inherently improbable that a robber could
have accomplished this feat without being seen, and have vanished
without leaving a trace. It felt that it was extraordinary that the robbery should have occurred only a few days before defendant's term of
office expired, at which time he would be called to account for the
money entrusted him.
.
.
To show that defendant may not in fact have been locked in the
vault, the court carefuIIy analyzed the testimony concerning his release. The wife testified that she knew the combination of the outer
door of the vault but, being excited, missed it on her first try; the
court pointed out that this would lock the door. Although the wife
testified that she unlocked the inner door, using defendant's key which
she found in the lock, neither of the corroborating witnesses could say
positively that this door was locked.
The district attorney displayed considerable ingenuity in establishing two circumstances tending to show the defendant was not
locked inside the vault. First, he showed that the bolts of both doors
could be shot from the inside, creating_an iIIusory appearance that they
were locked. Secondly, he stationed witnesses throughout the courthouse while a man inside the vault kicked its door and struck its sheetiron sides. These witnesses testified that while the kicks on 'the door
82

County of Sonoma v. Stofen, 125 Cal. 32, 57 P. 681 (1899).
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were audible, "the blows upon the walls were loud and resonant like
the beating of a bass drum." Since the defendant was thoroughly
familiar with the construction of the vault, it was felt that if he had
really been locked inside, he would have beat upon the walls to summon aid.
3. Conclusion. The lawyer confronted with testimony which he
is unable to contradict with direct evidence has, then, a number of
methods open to avoid a directed verdict. The most obvious, of course,
is to impeach the witness. Failing this, all is still not lost. The testimony may be shown upon analysis to be inherently improbable, as in
the story of the deeds delivered by Mrs. Held, the attempted rape of
the elderly chiropractor, or the daring daylight robbery of the county
treasurer. Or it may of itself reveal circumstances casting suspicion on
its credibility, as in the case of the fire insurance policies, or indirectly
contradicting it, as in the case of the house purchased by the mother for
her son. Whether or not the testimony will stand up under careful
scrutiny, independent evidence may be available to show its improbability, as the testimony of the medical expert did in the workmen's compensation case. Or independent evidence of outside circumstances may serve to contradict the testimony, as was done by
showing the ~bsence of bank deposits in the bond case and the construction of the vault in the case of the county treasurer.
In jurisdictions following the majority rule precedent is of little
value in deciding whether uncontradicted testimony is conclusive. "The
only rule of law involved is that which announces that the judge
will determine the matter without the assistance of the jury, when
reasonable minds applied to the evidence could properly come to but
one conclusion. The legal principle is simple, and the real question in
every case is not a question of law in any proper sense of the word, but
is a question of logic, or reason, or judgment. . . ." 33 The answer
depends peculiarly on the ingenuity of the trial lawyer and the sound
discretion of the judge.
Robert L. Cardon, S.Ed.
33

Jerke v. Delmont State Bank, 54 S.D. 446 at 460,

223

N.W. 585 (1929).

